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CRIMINAL LAW: THE CONSPIRACY
HEARSAY EXCEPTION AND ITS
ERRATIC APPLICATION
1. INTRODUCTION
The crime of conspiracy has grown substantially in its appli-
cation since its statutory origin nearly six centuries ago.' Few
crimes are so widely discussed and so inadequately understood as
the crime referred to as the "darling of the prosecutor's nursery.
2
By its very nature, conspiracy has proved to be a great tool for se-
curing convictions. One reason for its frequent use centers around
the conspiracy hearsay exception-the subject of this Comment. A
preliminary understanding of conspiracy reveals that the essence of
the crime is the agreement. 3 In effect, the criminal act is the agree-
ment itself 4 by two or more persons5 to achieve a particular object.
The most frequently quoted definition of conspiracy is that the
crime consists of an agreement by two or more persons to achieve
an unlawful purpose through lawful means or to achieve a lawful
purpose through unlawful means.'
Added to the crime of conspiracy is its most alluring feature,
the hearsay exception. The conspiracy hearsay exception is most
often defined as follows: Any act or declaration by one conspirator
is admissible against each and every co-conspirator. The practi-
tioner or court seeking a concise explanation of the conspiracy hear-
1. Ordinance of Conspirators, 33 Edw. I. (1305).
2. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
3. Jordan v. United States, 370 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1033, reh. denied, 388 U.S. 924 (1967). State v. Carbone, 10 N.J.
329, 336-37, 91 A.2d 571, 574 (1952).
4. Miller v. United States, 382 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 984 (1968), reh. denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968). People v. Fedele,
366 Ill. 618, 10 N.E.2d 346 (1937).
5. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 329-31 (1957); Roberts v.
United States, 416 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Andolschek,
142 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1944).
The federal courts have upheld the indictment and conviction of a sin-
gle conspirator. The theory is that the grand jury need only allege a con-
spiracy with persons "unknown" to the grand jury, thereby satisfying the
need for at least two conspirators. Kitchell v. United States, 354 F.2d 715
(1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966); Cross v. United States,
392 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1968).
6. United States v. Kompinski, 373 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1967); United
States v. DeLoache, 279 F. Supp. 720 (D. Mo. 1968); United States v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 231 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 426




say exception will be sorely disappointed. Precision and con-
sistency have eluded those courts which have attempted to apply
the exception. There is neither uniformity in the stating of the
"rule," nor in its application. Therefore, each court approaches the
problem in a quandry, ultimately aggravating the situation. The
scope of this Comment is merely to chart the elusive boundaries of
the exception. Owing to limited Supreme Court direction, trial
courts seem to be free to permit almost any evidence in a conspir-
acy trial to be admitted under the guise of the exception.
II. CONSPIRACY GENERALLY
The definition of conspiracy clearly makes the agreement the
crime.7 The agreement is frequently deemed to be proved, how-
ever, on the basis of extremely weak evidence.8 Given the fact that
conspiracy is by its very nature a secretive crime not subject to
scrutiny,9 the courts have consistently allowed proof of the agree-
ment to derive solely from circumstantial evidence inferred from
the acts of the parties.' 0 Such inferences are permitted even
though in some cases there is a total lack of evidence that the de-
fendants ever actually contacted one another,' or even knew each
other.
12
Conspiracy has been made a broad, very general federal
crime,13 as well as a crime when conspiring to commit any one of a
7. State v. Carbone, 10 N.J. 329, 336-37, 91 A.2d 571, 574 (1952); See
Comment, Developments In the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv.
922 (1959).
8. Williams v. United States, 218 F.2d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 1954); People
v. Fedele, 366 Ill. 618, 10 N.E.2d 346 (1937); Cousens, Agreement As An
Element In Conspiracy, 23 VA. L. REv. 898 (1937).
9. Callanan v. United States, 394 U.S. 587 (1961); United States v.
Miller, 358 F.2d 696 (6th Cir. 1966); Phillips v. United States, 356 F.2d 297
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 952 (1966).
10. United States v. Jones, 425 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 823 (1970); McDonald v. United States, 19 F.2d 801, 803 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 551 (1927), quoted with approval in Galatas v.
United States, 80 F.2d 15, 23 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 711
(1936); Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt by Association, 54 GEo.
L.J. 133, 146 (1965).
11. United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1947);
United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
308 U.S. 287 (1939).
12. United States v. Aiken, 373 F.2d 294 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 833 (1967).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1948) provides:
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States.
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more
number of specified crimes. 14 Title 18 of the United States Code,
Section 371, proscribes conspiracy to commit "any offense" against
the federal government.'5 Additionally, a conspiracy to commit
an act that is a federal crime, is itself a crime.16 Several states
have followed the federal model proscribing conspiracy to commit
any offense and conspiracy to commit an already criminal act. At
common law conspiracy was an indictable offense as soon as the
agreement was formed,' 7 and absent a statute to the contrary it so
remains.' 8 A slight majority of the states and the federal govern-
ment' 9 have enacted statutes that add a requirement that the
prosecutor must, in addition to proving the agreement, also prove
an overt act. 20  The overt act must constitute a visible action that
serves to further the conspiracy.2' The apparent rationale for this
requirement is that without an overt act indictments could be ob-
tained and convictions secured solely on the basis of loose talk.
In jurisdictions having the overt act requirement, little advantage
seems to have accrued to the defendants.2 2  For example, courts
have held that a sufficient overt act may be noncriminal 23 or in-
nocuous.
24
Acts including an otherwise legal meeting or interview,25 a
telephone call 26 or attendance at a public meeting have all been
held to satisfy the overt act requirement.2 7  The statutes call
of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object
of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such
conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for
such misdemeanor.
14. For a complete list of federal conspiracy statutes, see notes follow-
ing the text of 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (1948).
15. See note 13 supra.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., State v. Loser, 132 Iowa 419, 104 N.W. 337 (1905);
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-332 (1956); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 184; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 583. For a complete listing of statutes, see
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03, Appendix C. (Draft 10, 1960).
20. Woodring v. United States, 376 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 885 (1967); Comment, Developments In The Law-Crimi-
nat Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920, 945 (1959); Levie, Hearsay and Con-
spiracy, 52 MicH. L. REv. 1159 (1954).
21. People v. George, 74 Cal. App. 440, 241 P. 97 (Dist. Ct. App. 1925).
22. The courts somehow discover an overt act in the slightest action
on the part of the conspirators. Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35
GEo. L.J. 328, 338 (1947).
23. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 333-34 (1957); Braverman v.
United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942); United States v. Sterkel, 430 F.2d
1262 (10th Cir. 1970); Reese v. United States, 353 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1965).
24. People v. George, 74 Cal. App. 440, 241 P. 97 (Dist. Ct. App. 1925).
25. Kaplan v. United States, 7 F.2d 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 269
U.S. 582 (1925).
26. Smith v. United States, 92 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1937).
27. Pollack, supra note 22, at 338.
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merely for the slightest physical evidence manifesting that an
agreement exists.28 The only potential safeguard is that the overt
act must occur after the agreement is formed and cannot be one of
the acts that occurred 'during the formulation of the conspiracy.
Otherwise, any act that even remotely tends to show the existence
of an agreement will suffice.29 There is is also a significant excep-
tion to the overt act rule. Where a substantive offense has been
charged in the indictment along with a conspiracy, 0 the allegation
of the substantive offense eliminates the need to charge an overt
act. That is, if a party is charged with conspiracy to commit an
act as well as the actual commission of the crime, no overt acts
need be proved in order to secure a conviction on the conspiracy
charge.3' Such prosecutions-a combined conspiracy and substan-
tive offense charge-seem to constitute the majority of the con-
spiracy prosecutions.12 Nevertheless, prosecutions solely for con-
spiracy are common.3 3
An extremely detailed study of all the elements of the crime
of conspiracy is well beyond the scope and intent of this Comment.
Instead, this Comment is aimed at an understanding of the feature
of conspiracy that appeals to prosecutors: the conspiracy hearsay
exception 4 Although the essence of conspiracy is the agreement,
it is the hearsay exception that greatly aids the prosecutor in se-
curing convictions. Because of the so-called hearsay exception,
conspiracy indictments and convictions have proved to be quite
28. United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385, 400 (2d Cir. 1966); Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). See note 19 supra.
29. United States v. Turner, 274 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). The
overt act committed by a government informer was held sufficient to sup-
port indictment and conviction in United States v. Fellabaum, 408 F.2d 220,
223 (7th Cir. 1969). See also Bannon v. United States, 154 U.S. 464 (1895);
Brock v. Hudspeth, 111 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1940). An overt act performed
prior to the entry of an additional conspirator is sufficient against the
later joining member.
The overt act requirement is also satisfied by non-feasance. United
States v. Offutt, 127 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (failure to report for military
induction).
30. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912); United States v.
Chambers, 382 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1967).
31. The federal courts also permit a conspiracy conviction to stand
where the defendants were acquitted of the substantive offense which con-
stituted the required overt acts. Nassif v. United States, 370 F.2d 147 (8th
Cir. 1966).
32. See Developments In The Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HAnv.
L. REv. 922 (1959).
33. Id.
34. See generally Moscowitz, Some Aspects of the Trial of a Criminal
Case in the Federal Court, 3 F.R.D. 380, 392 (1944).
easy to secure. Perhaps most enticing to prosecutors is the fact
that conspiracy can be readily tacked onto an already completed
substantive charge or an attempt charge.3 5 In other words, the
prosecutor can secure an indictment alleging an attempted or com-
pleted crime, then add the charge of conspiring to commit or at-
tempt to commit that very crime.36 The effect is to allow the pros-
ecution to use the relaxed hearsay rules of conspiracy to admit
otherwise inadmissible evidence into the multi-count trial which
includes the conspiracy charge.37 The hearsay testimony relating
to the conspiracy charge thus goes before the jury-usually with
a cautionary instruction that it applies only to the conspiracy
charge-and once before the jury it has the practical effect of ac-
tually applying to all the charges. As Mr. Justice Jackson noted in
Krulewitch v. United States: "The naive assumption that prejudi-
cial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury .. . all
practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction. . . ,,18 An
added bonus is that the conspiracy and the substantive offense do
not merge and thereby two separate convictions can arise out of a
single completed, substantive crime.3 9  It should be recalled that
despite the option of combining conspiracy with a substantive
crime, it can stand alone as a separate weapon in the government's
arsenal of charges. It is little wonder that conspiracy is the prose-
cutors' "darling." The conspiracy hearsay exception is the impor-
tant evidentiary avenue which entices prosecutors, confuses courts
and juries and ultimately convicts defendants.
35. United States v. Bradley, 421 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Chambers, 382 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Wolfson,
294 F. Supp. 267 (D. Del. 1968). But see United States v. Skellerman, 442
F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1971).
The courts have sustained consecutive sentences arising out of convic-
tions on the substantive crime as well as conspiracy to commit the sub-
stantive crime. Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 976 (1969); Johnstone v. United States, 418 F.2d 1094
(5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Fellabaum, 408 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 858 (1970).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Branker, 395 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1029 (1969); United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015 (1967), reh. denied, 392 U.S. 948 (1968).
These cases held it not error per se to combine the crimes of conspiracy and
the substantive offense. The courts rejected the defense arguments that the
relaxed conspiracy rules of evidence "confused" the jury as to the substan-
tive offense. In Branker the court did reverse as to some of the defendants
who played a "minor" role in the crime. The Branker court, by way of
dicta, questioned the practice of joining conspiracy and substantive counts.
The Court in Kahn, however, expressly supported the concept.
37. Id.
38. 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949).
39. See cases at note 35 supra. In addition the defendants may also
be convicted absent any showing of knowledge of what other conspirators
may have done. The prosecution need only establish that the defendant
understood the general nature of the conspiracy's object. United States v.
Quinn, 445 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Fellabaum, 408 F.2d
220 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 906 (1969).
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III. CONSPIRACY HEARSAY EXCEPTION
To the everlasting frustration of law students and practioners,
the hearsay rule is riddled with myriad exceptions. 40 One key ex-
ception is most significant in the field of conspiracy law: any act
or declaration by one conspirator is admissible against each and
every conspirator. 41 Hearsay usually finds its way into evidence
by way of a witness repeating the words of an absent individual
and having those words admitted against the defendant.42 In con-
spiracy, however, more is accomplished. The absent individual be-
ing quoted is one of the co-conspirators, frequently himself part
of a multi-defendant trial. For the declarant, of course, no hearsay
problem arises since he always has the option of testifying and ex-
plaining his statements.43 However, the declarant's comments are
being used against each and every defendant on trial,44 not merely
as damning evidence, but to be considered as if they were the state-
ments and acts of every defendant. 45 In fact, the jury is instructed
that what one defendant says or does is to be considered the act or
declaration of all defendants. 46 Of course, the only way to over-
come the hearsay is for the declarant to testify-an often undesira-
ble course for a defendant-declarant. For example, if defendant A
is quoted as saying something damaging, it is considered to be the
statement of defendants B, C, D, and E. If each has allegedly said
or done something damaging, then, at trial each defendant is legally
considered to have said or done five damaging things. In effect,
each defendant is raised to the highest level of culpability through
the hearsay exception's multiplier effect. The hearsay multiplier
effect cannot technically be used against a defendant until inde-
pendent evidence (non-hearsay) has established him to be a mem-
ber of the conspiracy.
4 7
The words and deeds of one conspirator are not merely used
40. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE § 63, lists 31 exceptions to the hear-
say rule. See also 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397 (3d ed. 1940).
41. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 657-58 (1896); Phillips v.
United States, 356 F.2d 297 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 952 (1966).
42. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1361 (3d ed. 1940).
43. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (3d ed. 1940).
44. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); 4 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1079 (3d ed. 1940).
45. Id.
46. See note 49 and accompanying text infra.
47. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 393
(1948); United States v. Cerrito, 413 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1004 (1970). The mutuality of liability has been extended to make
each conspirator liable for punishment for the substantive offense com-
mitted by a fellow conspirator. United States v. McGuire, 249 F. Supp. 43
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 381 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1053 (1968).
against another conspirator, but rather they are the words and
deeds of all involved. Such mutuality of responsibility is rested
rather loosely in two areas: history and agency. The rationale of
agency principles being the logical force behind the conspiracy
hearsay exception seems to be less influential than the very con-
siderable and long history of the exception.48 It is not clear why
the exception first arose but certainly practicality must have been
a force.
The historical view of conspiracy has practicality on its side
and at least a limited amount of logical support. For example,
a group of individuals might agree to each perform a series of
seemingly separate and insignificant acts-perhaps all completely
legal actions-but with an intent to achieve an unlawful objective.
If no conspiracy laws existed, so the argument goes, then law en-
forcement would have to stand idly by and await completion of a
crime or until the parties attempted a substantive crime. The
problem would arise because there is no such thing as "attempted"
conspiracy. The conspiracy exists or it does not. Therefore, if con-
spiracy were not a crime the law would only be allowed to await a
fait accompli before acting. The argument is not unique and is re-
peated frequently to bolster the historical basis of the laws.
The following jury instruction illustrates the basis of classic
conspiracy as applied nearly 150 years ago:
If you find that these two persons pursued by their
acts, the same object, often by the same means, one per-
forming one part of an act and the other another part of
the same act, so as to complete it, with a view to attaining
the object which they were pursuing, you will be at liberty
to draw the conclusion that they have been engaged in a
conspiracy to effect that object .... If you are satisfied
that there was concert between them, I am bound to say
that, being convinced of the conspiracy, it is not necessary
that you should find both M and D doing each particular
act, as after the conspiracy is once established in your
minds, whatever is either said or done by either of the
defendants in pursuance of the common design is, both in
law and common sense, to be considered the act of both.49
Modern courts generally ignore any discussion of the basis for
the hearsay exception in conspiracy, but those that look to its ra-
48. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbing v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th
Cir. 1954); in which the court concluded:
The supposed distinction between the acts of a co-conspirator
and those of an agent in a criminal case, is in reality one without
a difference. The basic rule is that 'the acts of any agent, within
the scope of his authority, are competent against his principal.'
(citation omitted).
Id. at 751. Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926);
See text accompanying note 50 infra.
49. Murphy's Case (1837), from instructions to the jury by Judge
Coleridge, as reported in W.S. Wright, The Law of Criminal Conspiracies
and Agreements, Banks & Brothers, N.Y. (1891).
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tionale often rely on agency principles. Judge Learned Hand de-
clared the exception to be based solely on agency:
Such declarations are admitted upon no doctrine of the
law of evidence, but of the substantive law of the crime.
When men enter into an agreement for an unlawful end,
they become ad hoc agents for one another, and have made
a "partnership in crime." What one does pursuant to their
common purpose, all do, and as declarations may be such
acts, they are competent against all.5°
The agency concept has also been cited with approval by the
Supreme Court.5 1 Whatever the rationale of the conspiracy hear-
say exception, it has been modified by three threshold require-
ments for admissibility: (a) prior independent proof that a con-
spiracy exists, (b) proof that the hearsay furthers the goal of the
conspiracy, and (c) that the hearsay occurred during the pendency
of the conspiracy. Although each of these elements will be dis-
cussed in detail, a cursory examination is necessary before engaging
in a detailed study of acts and declarations, the very heart of the
conspiracy hearsay exception. Ostensibly a conspiracy must be
proved to exist by independent proof prior to the admission of any
hearsay evidence against the defendants. Thereafter, the conspir-
acy hearsay exception allows into evidence against all other con-
spirators the acts and declarations of any conspirator.5 2 In order
to be admitted against the other conspirators the hearsay evidence
must have been in furtherance of the conspiracy's goal in some
fashion. 53 The hearsay must also have occurred during the pend-
ency of the conspiracy, pendency being the period between the be-
ginning of the alleged conspiracy and its apparent end.5 4 The lim-
itations and definitions of the exception give the hearsay exception
at least the appearance of firmness and having safeguards. Its
realistic application creates an entirely contrary picture, the dis-
cussion of which follows.
A. Acts and Declarations
The three elements alluded to previously are of no value until
the practitioner appreciates the confusion surrounding the seem-
ingly simple expression "acts and declarations." The confusion is
50. Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926).
51. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617 (1952).
52. United States v. DeCavalcante, 440 F.2d 1264, 1273 (3d Cir. 1971);




caused largely by frequent repetition of the conspiracy hearsay
exception by the courts without an adequate distinction being
made between acts and declarations. At first glance the lumping
together of acts and declarations into the exception seems logical
enough. However, by strict definition, hearsay is a purely oral
form of evidence. 5 The courts, while continuing to give lip service
to the phraseology of the exception, are split over whether acts, by
their very nature, can be barred from admissibility under the
hearsay rule, let alone admitted as an exception to it. Tradition-
ally, there is support for including acts as part of hearsay for the
purpose of the conspiracy hearsay.5" The most important case dis-
tinguishing between acts and declarations is the Supreme Court de-
cision in Lutwak v. United States.57 The defendants were charged
with conspiracy to violate the immigration laws. They were con-
victed of marrying United States citizens for the sole purpose of
avoiding immigration quotas, then subsequently divorcing their
American spouses, all as part of an elaborate plan. In affirming
the convictions, the Supreme Court for the first time drew an im-
portant distinction between acts and declarations.
Acts which took place after the conspiracy ended were
relevant to show the spuriousness of the marriages and the
intent of the parties in going through the marriage cere-
monies were competent-such as the fact that the parties
continued to live apart after they came to the United
States; that money was paid the so-called wives as con-
sideration for their part in the so-called marriages ...
Declarations stand on a different footing. Declara-
tions of one conspirator may be used against the other con-
spirator not present on the theory that the declarant is the
agent of the other, and the admissions of one are admissi-
ble against both under the standard exception to the hear-
say rule applicable to statements of a party. 8
Logan v. United States,59 a frequently cited case prior to Lut-
wak, had concluded that acts were subject to the same hearsay
standards as declarations. In Lutwak the Court laid the Logan dic-
tum to rest and ruled that acts occurring during a conspiracy are
admissible against all, as well as those acts committed in the post-
conspiracy phase.6 0 Lutwak reiterated that post-conspiracy dec-
larations are barred from admission except when used against the
55. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1361-63 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
56. For cases supporting the combination of acts and declarations,
see Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); United States v. Rosen-
blum, 176 F.2d 321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 388 U.S. 893 (1949). But see
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1952); United States v. Ross, 321
F.2d 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1963). See also C. McCoRmicK,
EVIDENCE § 225 (1954); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1361-63 (McNaughton
Rev. 1961).
57. 344 U.S. 604 (1952).
58. Id. at 617 (emphasis supplied).
59. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
60. 344 U.S. 604, 618 (1952).
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declarant alone.6' It is noteworthy that nowhere in Lutwak or
any subsequent Supreme Court cases, does the Court delve into the
distinction between acts and declarations that occur during the full
operation of the conspiracy.62 Lutwak has been interpreted as re-
moving acts from the co-conspirator rule, thus freeing acts from
the limitations of furtherance and pendency.0 The usual test for
the admissibility of acts is relevancy.64 Since the usual hearsay
rule involves only declarations, the distinction is crucial. Lutwak's
effect was partially to clarify the standards of admissibility- of acts
under a relevancy standard and has been so interpreted frequently
as in the Second Circuit decision by Judge Friendly in United
States v. Costello:
Evidence of an act. . . has no special evidentiary hurdle to
overcome and, whether the act is by a co-conspirator or
third person and whether it occurs during the period of a
conspiracy or not, the evidence is admissible so long as the
act is probative of a crime charged against a defendant and
the evidence is not excludible on some special ground ...
An act of any other conspirator during the alleged con-
spiracy and in furtherance of it almost inevitably meets
this test, and, as held in Lutwak, acts by such others even
before or after the period of the conspiracy may still be
relevant in suggesting its existence and aims.65
In short, acts are freely admitted without regard for the time
they occurred, so long as probative. Once admitted under the rele-
vancy standard, the acts of one continue to be considered the acts
of all, under whatever theory of admissibility the courts choose. 66
As often as not, the courts cite the hearsay exception, but fail to
distinguish between acts and declarations and proceed to ignore
the basis for the group liability.6 7 Commentators seem to agree
only that confusion exists surrounding acts and declarations. The
most feasible, and often quoted conclusion is that acts are admitted
under a relevancy standard while declarations come in under the
hearsay exception.6" The hearsay exception in conspiracy is not
intended as a conduit for every type of otherwise castoff evidence.
61. Id.
62. See cases listed at note 56 supra. See also note 74 infra.
63. United States v. Costello, 352 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1965).
64. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 12 (3d ed. 1940).
65. 352 F.2d 848, 854 (2d Cir. 1965).
66. Comment, Developments In The Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72
HARV. L. REV. 922 (1959).
67. Id.
68. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1420-27 (3d ed. 1940) in which Pro-
fessor Wigmore discusses the theory behind the hearsay exceptions and
their future.
The requirements of furtherance, pendency and an independent
proof of conspiracy still ostensibly limit the admissibility of dec-
larations. Contra, however, is the apparently solitary limitation on
acts that there be independent proof of a conspiracy."9 This
threshold apparently exists as a requisite for agency on the theory
of admitting the act of one against all. 70 It therefore becomes im-
portant to understand what constitutes furtherance, pendency and
independent proof of a conspiracy. As will be noted in detail the
requirements of furtherance and pendency would only apply to
declarations,7' while independent proof of conspiracy would apply
to both acts and declarations.7 2 If, however, courts continue in
their confusion combining acts and declarations, the three tests will
naturally apply to both.
73
B. Furtherance and Pendency
Furtherance requires an advancing of the conspiracy or its
object while pendency, strictly defined, is the time between the
formation of the conspiracy and its conclusion. Therefore, in order
to rigidly adhere to the requirements, the evidence, to be admissi-
ble against all conspirators, must relate to the period during the
life of the conspiracy. The definition of furthering the object of
the conspiracy "does not appear to mean that the particular act or
declaration must have been shown to have advanced the cause of
the conspirators. '74  The word furtherance is often quoted by
courts but almost universally so without explanation.75 The Su-
preme Court, as early as its 1896 decision in Wiborg v. United
States, concluded that declarations are admissible if "explanatory
of acts done in furtherancy of the conspiracy. '7 6 In United States
v. E.I. duPont deNemours and Co., the court citing Wiborg, con-
cluded:
[I]t is sufficient for the purposes of admissibility if
the subject matter of the conspirator's admission relates
to the purpose of the conspiracy or is explanatory of acts
done in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy. Thus
a statement by a co-conspirator to a third party concerning
some act done in furtherance of the conspiracy is admissi-
69. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617 (1952).
70. See note 48 supra.
71. See notes 75-114 infra.
72. See notes 115-132 infra.
73. Numerous courts have continued to repeat the rule that requires
acts to be committed in furtherance of the conspiracy in order to be admis-
sible against all, thereby confusing an already hopeless tangle. See, e.g.,
United States v. Giesehaltz, 278 F. Supp. 434 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); United
States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971). But see United States v.
Roselli, 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970) in which the court noted that allega-
tions of furtherance are unnecessary.
74. Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt By Association, 54 GEo.
L.J. 133, 139 (1965).
75. Id.
76. 163 U.S. 632, 657-58 (1896).
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ble although the actual making of the statement in no way
furthered the conspiracy.
77
The term "explanatory" or the expression "relates to the pur-
pose of the conspiracy," come very close to being synonymous with
relevancy. Applying a pure relevancy standard under the guise of
a furtherance test, the court in Allen v. United States78 ruled that
the furtherance test was satisfied in a prohibition case. The state-
ment of an unidentified woman was admitted on the grounds that
she was a conspirator, the inference of her conspiratorial status be-
ing drawn solely from her presence in an illegal speakeasy.79 In
Lutwak 0 the Supreme Court had established a distinction between
acts and declarations. The distinction had a purpose relating to
the admissibility of certain evidence tied directly to furtherance."'
Although the Court in Lutwak did not define furtherance, it did
hint at a guidepost for other courts:
[A] declaration can be used against the co-conspirator
only when made in furtherance of the conspiracy....
There can be no furtherance of a conspiracy that has
ended. Therefore, the declarations of a conspirator do not
bind the co-conspirator if made after the conspiracy has
ended .... The acts, being relevant to prove the con-
spiracy were admissible, even though they might have oc-
curred after the conspiracy ended.82
Although expressly permitting post conspiracy acts to be ad-
mitted despite the fact that they occurred outside the pendency
of the conspiracy, the Court nevertheless clearly barred any post
conspiracy declarations in the federal courts.8 3 The importance of
77. 107 F. Supp. 324, 325 (D. Del.), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (empha-
sis added).
78. 4 F.2d 688, 693-94 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 598, reh. de-
nied, 268 U.S. 689 (1925).
79. A case similar to Allen is United States v. Harrison, 121 F.2d 930
(3d Cir. 1941). In that case the court expressly upheld the admission
of evidence regarding the actions of two unidentified individuals seen near
a criminal hyjacking from interstate commerce. The court upheld the ad-
mission of their acts against the defendants on the grounds that they could
be inferred to be co-conspirators. The court wrote:
That these unknown parties were co-conspirators might of
course be inferred from the circumstances and did not have to be
directly proved. Unknown conspirators may be indicted along
with named conspirators. The acts of any co-conspirator are ad-
missible against all even when the actors are not indicted and
even though the accused was not present (emphasis added).
Id. at 934. Harrison has never been expressly overruled, nor followed in
any other reported case.
80. 344 U.S. 604, 617 (1952).
81. Id. at 617-18.
82. Id. at 618 (emphasis supplied).
83. Id.
distinguishing between acts and declarations was underscored
when the Court waived the furtherance requirement for post-con-
spiracy acts. It is noteworthy that the sole adjective applied by
the Supreme Court to acts was "relevancy." So long as the post-
conspiracy act is relevant to show the motive of the conspirators
during the conspiracy, then the furtherance test is no bar to ad-
missibility.8 4 Both the Uniform Rules of Evidence8" and the Model
Code of Evidence 6 have done away with the furtherance test, re-
quiring only the duPont8 7 "relation" to the conspiracy and requir-
ing that the declarations occur during the pendency of the actual
conspiracy.88 Neither the Uniform Rules nor the Model Code dis-
cuss acts in terms of pendency. Although some courts have man-
aged a stylized adaptation of their own by adopting a res gestae
approach to admitting the hearsay,8 9 thereby using a relevancy
standard, bypassing the furtherance requirement. This theory of
admissibility seems an unnecessary torturing of res gestae and in-
dicates a limited understanding of the nature of the conspiracy
hearsay exception. As Lutwak makes painfully clear, the further-
ance test cannot be studied in a vacuum. Closely allied to further-
ance is the pendency rule. Regardless of the definition applied to
furtherance, federal courts continue to apply the pendency require-
ment to declarations.9 A strict reading of the rule would limit
the admissibility of acts and declarations to those that occurred
after the beginning of the conspiracy and before its end. Although
Lutwak had dealt only with post-conspiracy acts, its ruling has
been interpreted by a few courts to lift the pendency requirement
from pre-conspiracy acts as well.9 1
In Krulewitch v. United States, the Supreme Court referred to
the "scrupulously observed" federal requirement that hearsay
statements are admissible only when made in furtherance and "in
the course of" (pendency) the conspiracy.9 2 Hearsay 'declarations
in furtherance of a conspiracy are admissible in federal courts only
if made during the life of the conspiracy. 3 Once a conspiracy is
deemed to exist, any later joining conspirator is liable for the dec-
larations (or acts) that occurred after the formation of the con-
spiracy but prior to his entry.9 4 The pendency rule then is meas-




87. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
88. See notes 82-86 supra.
89, Shea v. United States, 251 F. 440 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S.
581 (1918); Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 19, 25, 14 S.W.2d 194 (1929).
90, See cases cited at notes 35, 36 supra.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Costello, 352 F.2d 848, 854 (2d Cir. 1965).
92. 336 U.S. 440, 444 (1949).




persons,9 5 not from the date of the joining by the last conspirator.
The federal adherence to the pendency restriction was reiter-
ated in Dutton v. Evans.9 6 In Dutton the crucial element was the
Court's decision that the states could completely eliminate the
pendency rule as it relates to hearsay declarations in state con-
spiracy trials.9 7 The Court affirmed the constitutionality of a
Georgia statute98 which permitted the introduction of post-con-
spiracy hearsay declarations.
It is settled that in federal conspiracy trials the hearsay
exception that allows evidence of an out-of-court state-
ment of one conspirator to be admitted against his fellow
conspirators applies only if the statement was made in
the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and not
during a subsequent period when the conspirators were
engaged in nothing more than concealment of the criminal
enterprise . . . . [I]t does not follow that because the fed-
eral courts have declined to extend the hearsay exception
to include out-of-court statements made during the conceal-
ment phase of a conspiracy, such an extension automati-
cally violates the Confrontation Clause.99
The theory of the Georgia statute, like rules of other states,10 0
is that there is a post-conspiracy concealment phase during which
admissions and declarations are often made. The concealment
phase idea was soundly rejected in Krulewitch'0 l as it involved
federal trials, but clearly given new life in the states in Dutton.
95. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81 (1970).
96. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
97. The court in Dutton also reiterated its firm intention to allow the
admission of hearsay in conspiracy trials.
It is not argued, nor could it be, that the constitutional right
to confrontation requires that no hearsay evidence ever be intro-
duced .... Appellee does not challenge and we do not question
the validity of the conspirator exception applied in the federal
courts.
Id. at 80.
98. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1933).
99. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81 (1970).
100. See, e.g., the following cases and statutes upholding a similar ab-
sence of pendency; Reed v. People, 156 Colo. 450, 402 P.2d 68 (1965);
State v. Roberts, 95 Kan. 280, 147 P. 828 (1915). See also 2 F. WHARTON,
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 430 (12 ed. 1955):
The acts and declarations of a conspirator are admissible
against a co-conspirator when they are made during the pendency
of the wrongful act, and this includes not only the perpetration of
the offense but also its subsequent concealment....
The theory for the admission of such evidence is that persons
who conspire to commit a crime, and who do commit a crime, are
as much concerned, after the crime, with their freedom from appre-
hension, as they were concerned, before the crime, with its com-
mission thereof into a conspiracy to avoid arrest and implication.
101. 336 U.S. 440, 442 (1949).
An additional factor that makes post-conspiracy declarations a
threat to defendants is that the burden is on the defense to af-
firmatively establish the date the conspiracy ended.102 The prose-
cution need only prove the date the conspiracy began, not its
end.103 Therefore, even in a state without a statute like Georgia's,
the defendant must establish the ending date of the conspiracy in
order to invoke the bar to post-conspiracy declarations.
Pre-conspiracy events present a problem of a different texture.
In United States v. Costello, the Second Circuit determined that
acts, both before and after the conspiracy are not barred from ad-
mission into evidence in federal trials. 0 4 The Second Circuit cited
Lutwak as its authority for the proposition,'"5 but support from
Lutwak is only inferential. Federal courts are expressly prevented
from introducing post-conspiracy declarations, 106  whereas the
states are not. But pre-conspiracy declarations are wholly differ-
ent. Massachusetts, for example, allows the admission of pre-
conspiracy hearsay declarations. 0 7
The relation of parties charged with conspiracy is not an
immaterial matter and, unless too remote, acts and trans-
actions prior to the alleged date of the conspiracy are rele-
vant. The date when a conspiracy is alleged to have begun
is not, in effect, a wall behind which the court and jury
may never look for the purpose of discovering facts that
may have a bearing upon the fact of the conspiracy 0 8
In light of Dutton, the Supreme Court would apparently ap-
prove the admission of such testimony on a state level. Under
much the same rationale of relevancy and practicality, other states
have also permitted admission of pre-conspiracy hearsay. 0 9
To summarize, federally, there exists a distinction between
acts and declarations with only declarations subject to the limita-
tions of furtherance and pendency. Acts, in the federal courts,
are admissible so long as they meet the test of relevancy. Hearsay
102. Parenti v. United States, 249 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1963).
103. United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945).
104. 352 F.2d 848, 854 (2d Cir. 1965).
105. Id. at 853.
106. United States v. Harrell, 436 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1970). The ban on
post-trial declarations was extended to include guilty pleas by co-conspira-
tors entered before trial. Trussell v. United States, 278 F.2d 478 (6th Cir.
1960); United States v. Hall, 178 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1950); United States v.
Toner, 173 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1949). See generally Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
107. See generally Toomey, Some Procedural Aspects of the Prosecu-
tion of a Conspiracy In The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 53 MAss.
L.Q. 207 (1965).
108. Commonwealth v. Beal, 314 Mass. 210, 227, 50 N.E.2d 14 (1943).
See also Commonwealth v. Cheng, 310 Mass. 293, 295, 37 N.E.2d 1010
(1941).
109. State v. Simon, 113 N.J.L. 521, 174 A. 867 (1934); Ross v. State,
98 Tex. Crim. 567, 267 S.W. 499 (1925); Arlington v. State, 98 Tex. Crim. 68,
263 S.W. 593 (1924).
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declarations are closely scrutinized and must have occurred during
the life of the conspiracy and not during any preparation or con-
cealment phase. The furtherance test remains in the federal
courts as a source of confusion. The furtherance test is apparently
met by anything that actually advances the object of the con-
spiracy, explains an act that advances the conspiracy or is relevant
to the operation of the conspiracy. In short, the federal courts ap-
ply a relevancy-explanation test to declarations. The state courts
present a different matter. The states have not generally dealt
with distinctions between acts and declarations. Instead, they
have, via the Dutton decision, apparently eliminated the pendency
limitation of hearsay declarations. Likewise some states have fol-
lowed the federal lead in reducing the furtherancy test to one of
mere relevancy.
C. Independent Proof
The requirement of an independent proof of a conspiracy was
intended as a safeguard for defendants.1 10 Ostensibly, a conspiracy
must first be proved by independent (i.e. non-hearsay) evidence,
prior to the admission of hearsay testimony. The often quoted
fear was that if the rule were otherwise, "hearsay would lift itself
by its own bootstraps to the level of competent evidence.""' Since
the "gist" of the conspiracy "is the agreement among the conspira-
tors to commit an offense attended by an act of one or more of
the conspiracy,"1" 2 the requirement of independent proof goes to
establishing an agreement, prior to establishing the identities of the
conspirators.1 13  But in United States v. Cohen," 4 cited with ap-
proval in United States v. DeCavalcante,"5 the Third Circuit de-
clared that once the conspiracy is established only "slight evidence
may be sufficient to connect a defendant with it."6 The courts,
both federal and state, generally accept the circumstantial proof of
a conspiracy as sufficient to meet the requirement of independent
proof.' It is sufficient if the non-hearsay evidence indicates the
existence of a conspiracy. The Third Circuit has announced the
110. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159, 1176 (1954).
111. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942).
112. United States v. DeCavalcante, 440 F.2d 1264, 1272 (3d Cir. 1971).
113. Id.
114. 197 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1954).
115. 440 F.2d 1264 (3d Cir. 1971).
116. Id. at 1273.
117. United States v. Weber, 437 F.2d 327, 337 (3d Cir. 1970). In
United States v. Harris, 409 F.2d 77 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 965,
(1969), the court expressly upheld convictions based on circumstantial evi-
need for proof of a "prima facie" conspiracy" 8 without defining
the term. But in its 1971 decision in United States v. Bey,1 9 the
Third Circuit concluded:
• ..While it is true that hearsay statements are inadmis-
sible when no independent evidence links the declarant
to the defendant ... the threshold requirement for admis-
sibility is satisfied by presenting a likelihood of an illicit
association. . . . The trial judge has wide discretion and
need only be satisfied, if he accepts the independent evi-
dence as credible, that such evidence is sufficient to support
a finding of joint undertaking .... 120
It would seem therefore that circumstantial evidence proving
the "likelihood" of an "illicit association" establishes the independ-
ently proved conspiracy and the defendant's nexus to it. Once the
conspiracy is thus established only "slight evidence" is needed to
cement the defendant's connection to the conspiracy and thereafter
the prosecution could introduce hearsay under the guidelines pre-
viously discussed.1
2 1
Despite these minimal evidentiary requirements to prove the
conspiracy's existence, the courts have gone considerably further
in demolishing the safeguard. A literal reading of the independent
proof requirement would immediately plunge prosecutors and
judges into a confusing order of proof problem. Short of eliminat-
ing conspiracy as a crime, the problem was solved by a suspension
of the order of proving an independent conspiracy prior to the ad-
mission of hearsay.122 The accepted practice is to alter the order
of proof without technically doing away with the need for inde-
pendent proof of the conspiracy. Based on this relaxed order of
proof concept, the trial court need not make an independent find-
ing of competency. 128 The result of this alteration is often criti-
cized12 4 since it eliminates the need to prove the conspiracy prior
to the admission of hearsay. The court simply admits the hearsay
at any time during the trial "subject to a motion to strike for fail-
ure to connect it up.' 25 The practical application of the altered
dence, although participation was required to be proved by circumstantial
evidence of the defendant's own acts. See also United States v. Gisehaltz,
278 F. Supp. 434 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
118. United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970).
119. 437 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1971).
120. Id. at 190-91.
121. See notes 65-110 and accompanying text supra.
122. United States v. Sansone, 231 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 987 (1956).
123. United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 839 (1964); Hanson v. United States, 326 F.2d 152, 156 (9th Cir.
1963).
124. Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt By Association, 54
GEo. L.J. 133, 142 (1965); Comment, Developments In The Law-Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 H~v. L. REV. 922 (1959).
125. Parenti v. United States, 249 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1957).
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order of proof was succinctly outlined by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals:
While the practicalities of a conspiracy trial may require
that hearsay be admitted "subject to connection," the
judge must determine, when all the evidence is in, whether
in his view the prosecution has proved participation in the
conspiracy, by the defendant against whom the hearsay is
offered, by a fair preponderance of the evidence inde-
pendent of the hearsay utterances. If it has, the utter-
ances go to the jury for them to consider along with all
the other evidence in determining whether they are con-
vinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
If it has not, the judge must instruct the jury to disregard
the hearsay or, when this was so large as to render cau-
tionary instruction of doubtful utility ... declare a mis-
trial if the defendant asks for it.
126
The courts, bowing to the practical, have pushed the "boot-
strap" fears of Glasser v. United States 2 out of consideration.
Instead, the task falls to the judge to examine the government's
evidence at the close of the case and satisfy himself of the defend-
ant's participation on the basis of the non-hearsay evidence. 128 Un-
der strict rules of admissibility, the government would first open
its case and prove the existence of a conspiracy followed by proof
of the defendant's role in it. At that point the court could either
dismiss the case or admit hearsay. The present state of conspiracy
requires the court to determine at the close of the government's
126. United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969). The
Second Circuit has approved the discretionary order of proof in United
States v. Sansone, 231 F.2d 193, 198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 987
(1956). Speaking through Judge Friendly, the Second Circuit has also
sustained the method of having the trial judge determine the sufficiency
of a defendant's nexus to a conspiracy. The court in United States v. Nuc-
cio, 373 F.2d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 1967) noted:
And while a declaration of one alleged conspirator in furtherance
of the conspiracy otherwise banned by the hearsay rule is not
admissible against another without Proof of the latter's mem-
bership, the established rule in this Circuit is that determination
of the adequacy of such proof is for the judge and, if he is satis-
fied on that score, he is to leave the declaration 'to the jury to
use like any other evidence, without instructing them to consider it
as proof only after they too have decided a preliminary issue
which alone makes it competent.'
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 230-31 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand),
aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Judge Hand's ruling in Dennis, cited with approval in Nuccio has not
been uniformly embraced. In United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d
Cir. 1969), Judge Friendly managed a virtual turn around from his ruling in
Nuccio. See also United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1968),
vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969).
127. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
128. United States v. Bey, 437 F.2d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1971).
entire case, if the non-hearsay evidence established a conspiracy.
It should be recalled, however, that the court need find only cir-
curstantial evidence of a likelihood of a conspiracy and "slight
evidence"' 29 of the defendant's participation. Likewise, the court
may choose, as it often does, to leave the entire matter to the jury.
The practice of leaving the sifting task to the jury has been criti-
cized. In United States v. Dennis, the court stated:
The law is indeed not wholly clear as to who must decide
whether such a declaration may be used; but we think that
the better doctrine is that the judge is always to decide, as
concededly he generally must, any issues of fact on which
competence of evidence depends, and that, if he decides it
to be compentent, he is to leave it to the jury to use like
any other evidence, without instructing them to consider
it as proof only after they too have decided a preliminary
issue which alone makes it competent. Indeed, it is a prac-
tical impossibility for laymen, and for that matter, for
most judges, to keep their minds in the isolated compart-
ments that this requires.130
The modern view seems to be best described in Carbo v. United
States131 which capsulized the rulings in Dennis and other previ-
ous cases. The contemporary approach, developed into a synthesis
of rulings, would have the court apply a standard of admissibility
and thereafter, the jury would be permitted to use all the evidence
equally.
[ . . T]he test is not whether the defendants' connection
had by independent evidence been proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, but whether, accepting the independent evi-
dence as credible, the judge is satisfied that a prima facie
case (one which would support a finding) has been made.
Thereafter it is the jury's function to determine whether
the evidence including the declarations, is credible and
convincing beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial judge's finding on admissibility in no way re-
stricts the jury's inquiry into guilt or innocence.
132
The Ninth Circuit seems to have brushed aside the inherently
dubious methodology laid down in Dennis and replaced it with a
single threshold test for admissibility.
Given the jumbled order of proof concept, the defendant in-
deed "occupies an uneasy seat."'18 Granting that the defendant
129. United States v. DeCavalcante, 440 F.2d 1264, 1273 (3d Cir. 1971).
130. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 231 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 341 U.S.
494 (1951) (emphasis added). See note 126 supra
131. 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963).
132. Id. at 737.
133. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949) (Jackson, 3.
concurring):
When the trial starts, the accused feels the full impact of the
conspiracy strategy. Strictly, the prosecution should first estab-
lish prima facie the conspiracy and identify the conspirators, after
which evidence of acts and declarations of each in the course of
its execution are admissible against all. But the order of proof of
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has a uniquely discerning jury, they must still wade through large
quantities of hearsay evidence, frequently heard by the defendant
for the first time at trial. Presuming the jury capable of discern-
ing the hearsay, they must still apply only a watered down test of
a circumstantial likelihood of a conspiracy.
III. CONCLUSION
Conspiracy, the prosecutor's "darling," might better be termed
the defendant's "nightmare." Despite all the "limitations" on the
admission of hearsay, the practical truth is that secondhand evi-
dence will flow freely, almost unchecked, into the courtroom and
thereupon reduce the requirement of proof of each defendant's
guilt to the lowest level. That is, each act and declaration applies
to all other defendants thereby placing each defendant's guilt on
the level of the most culpable and soiled defendant.
If the defendant is unfortunate enough to be tried in a state
court he may well be strapped with the actions of other defendants
occurring before the first agreement or meeting (if indeed the de-
fendants ever met) and thereafter all the acts and statements of all
defendants. Since, as a practical matter, the prosecutor will not
generally bother with irrelevant matter, the defendant will have
virtually no grounds for objection when the jury is told about the
actions of another defendant-including actions occuring well after
the alleged conspiracy has ended. As far as declarations are con-
cerned, the defendant may attempt to block only those that have
so sprawling a charge is difficult for a judge to control. As a prac-
tical matter, the accused often is confronted with a hodgepodge of
acts and statements by others which he may never have authorized
or intended or even known about, but which help to persuade the
jury of existence of the conspiracy itself. In other words, a con-
spiracy often is proved by evidence that is admissible only upon
the assumption that conspiracy existed. The naive assumption
that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the
jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction
The trial of a conspiracy charge doubtless imposes a heavy
burden on the prosecution, but it is an especially difficult situation
for the defendant. The hazard from loose application of the rules
of evidence is aggravated where the Government institutes mass
trials . ..
A co-defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy seat.
There generally will be evidence of wrong-doing by somebody. It
is difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its
own merits in the minds of the jurors who are ready to believe
that birds of a feather are flocked together. If he is silent, he is
taken to admit it and if, as often happens, co-defendants can be
prodded into accusing or contradicting each other, they convict
each other.
Id. at 453-54.
nothing whatever to do with the crime. Any statement in a state
trial by anyone which "relates to" the crime is admissible-against
everyone. If the defendant is being tried in federal court, he can
block admission of statements made before and after the conspir-
acy, but not during.
If he is tried in a state court, the chances of barring such testi-
mony are greatly reduced, depending upon the state. The defend-
ant's rights, however, are "protected" since no hearsay may be ad-
mitted until a conspiracy has been independently proved and the
defendant's role in it likewise proved. Ignoring the order of proof
problem, the 'defendant may be tied to a conspiracy on only "slight
evidence" and the conspiracy proved through a mere "likelihood of
an illicit association" established by circumstantial evidence. In
short, the defendant is afforded little chance to distinguish him-
self from the other defendants.
From the morass of confusion surrounding the so-called con-
spiracy hearsay rule, comes only further confusion. The "rule,"
which is the very esence of criminal conspiracy, is as ethereal as
the Emperor's New Clothes were invisible.
As is often true in the law, the incantation has become a sub-
stitute for reasoning. But unlike many other areas of the law, the
conspiracy hearsay exception is a litany that does not bear scru-
tiny.
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